

Security Information

16 February 1953

**SUBJECT: FBI Report on Soviet Intentions**

1. The attached letter from the Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, is forwarded for information. The Bureau has previously made available information provided by the same informant, who has furnished "valuable and reliable information" in the past, in the opinion of the Bureau.
2. It will be noted that the statement that the Soviets will initiate an offensive through Yugoslavia and Turkey in the Spring of 1953 or 1954 appears to be dependent on the hypothesis that Stalin opposes war at the present time as the proper solution for the East-West conflict. This hypothesis is generally consistent with current national estimates of short-term Soviet intentions and the over-all conduct of Soviet foreign policy and psychological warfare appears to be aimed at creating conflict among the Western allies rather than conflict between the USSR and the West.
3. The launching of an offensive thus is based on the alleged illness of Stalin and the apparent prediction that he will die before the date for which hostilities are scheduled. While G-2 is not able to give a useful estimate of the 73-year old dictator's life expectancy it is noted that the Argentine Ambassador commented on Stalin's "excellent physical condition, mental agility, and general state of robust health that belie his 73 years" following an interview on 8 February, two days before the date of the Bureau's letter.
4. While Stalin's alleged illness thus cannot be accepted as fact, recent developments in the USSR support the conclusion that Deputy Prime Minister Georgi Malenkov has acquired an increasingly more responsible position in the hierarchy. The same evidence, however, leads to the conclusion that Malenkov's and Stalin's views are essentially

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identical. Therefore, the implication that Malenkov's directing a planned offensive, contrary to Stalin's wishes, is not supported by the evidence presented.

5. The report presents no evidence, and G-2 cannot supply such evidence, to show that the Soviets consider it necessary to eliminate Tito by March 1953. The Soviets might well attempt an assassination of Tito but this in itself would not cause a reorientation of Yugoslav policy. G-2 is unable to ascertain who the Soviet-sponsored successors to Tito, named phonetically in the report, may be.

6. The discussion in the report of the Soviet internal situation apparently is based on criticisms of Communist Party discipline made at the Soviet Communist Party Congress last October as well as on the current internal propaganda campaign aimed at increasing vigilance against anti-State acts. These moves appear thus far to be aimed primarily at medium level Party and Government officials, however, rather than at high level elements in the hierarchy.

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7. There have been other reports which may be connected with the information presented in the Bureau's letter.

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8. On the basis of the foregoing analysis, G-2 considers the information supplied by the Bureau to be unreliable. The information may be a deliberate Soviet plant, calculated to confuse, or what is more likely the report may be a fabrication by an individual who has little basic information to convey. The report thus is not considered to provide a useful contribution to drawing valid conclusions as to Soviet intentions.

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ATTACHMENTS